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Project: Pin down framing effects in situation of risky choice
Behavioral data
fMRI data
Object of interest: framing effects for risks
Questions
Risky choice type framing effects
Subjects are asked to make a risky choice between two
options that are presented in two different though logically
equivalent fashion. → Positive and negative frames.
Existing literature:
Kahneman and Tversky’s famous «Asian Disease» problem:
risk aversion for gains - in the positive frame, whereas
risk-seeking for losses - in the negative frame →
Inconsistency result achieved using a «between-subjects»
design.
Sandra L Schneider (1992) fleshed out this result, using a
«within-subjects» design, with several scenarios, not just the
«Asian-Disease» story: not a clear pattern for the negative
frame, while the risk aversion is confirmed for the positive
frame.
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Project: Pin down framing effects in situation of risky choice
Behavioral data
fMRI data
Object of interest: framing effects for risks
Questions
Aims
The design used by Sandra Schneider might lack of
robustness, because of a potential carryover effect: different
scenarios presented to the subjects without filler tasks.
Test Kahneman and Tversky’s inconsistency result again by
using another «within-subjects» design.
Hypothesis to be tested: the violation of the invariance rule is
due to an extrinsic (emotional-moral) factor: broadened
rationality hypothesis; alternative hypothesis: «Prospect
Theory» explanation.
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Project: Pin down framing effects in situation of risky choice
Behavioral data
fMRI data
Robustness of this type of framing effects
Violation of the invariance principle and irrationality
A multi-version of the «asian-disease problem»
Run several trials by varying the degree of moral-emotional
content of the scenarios: rate of death or live of humans, rate
of failure or success of a commercial product.
Use of a «within-subjects» procedure: each subject faces in
turn the positive frame (henceforth PF) and the negative
frame (NF) with «filler» tasks between frame pairs and
between the different scenarios; this to try to bypass the
potential carryover effect. Caveat
For each problem, one risky option, versus the «sure choice».
Look at the proportion of people making the risk averse
choice in the PF and the proportion making the risk averse
choice in the NF.
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Project: Pin down framing effects in situation of risky choice
Behavioral data
fMRI data
Robustness of this type of framing effects
Violation of the invariance principle and irrationality
Predictions
We expect «framing effect» to be the most frequent pattern
only in the most extreme scenarios; conversely the «softer»
scenarios might be associated with steady preferences across
the two frames (risk aversion).
Possible explanation: people are basically risk averse, but
there is a «moral» dimension guiding some decisions too.
This experimental design rests on a strong inference
reasoning: if prospect theory [resp. the competing hypothesis]
is true then we won’t [resp. will] observe sensitivity to the
emotional-moral content of the scenarios.
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Project: Pin down framing effects in situation of risky choice
Behavioral data
fMRI data
Robustness of this type of framing effects
Violation of the invariance principle and irrationality
«Norm retrieval» test (1 out of 3)
Zero in on the versions such that «framing effect» is the most
frequent pattern - we predict «asian-disease» will be in this
category; second step restricted to these cases.
Test «the robustness» of this violation of the invariance rule,
by making the latter directly accessible to the subject. → Sort
of «Revealed Preference Argument», echoing Slovic and
Tversky’s «Understanding/Accepting principle»:
If framing effects stem from bounded rationality then by
making the rational rule accessible, we should observe a
correction of the framing effect.
Conversely, if the rational rule is not used as a guide by the
subject, while the rule is available, this implies that the
logical invariance principle is dominated.
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Behavioral data
fMRI data
Robustness of this type of framing effects
Violation of the invariance principle and irrationality
«Norm retrieval» test (2 out of 3)
In practice: PF and NF are presented simultaneously; then
the experimenter informs the subject of the logical
equivalence through a purely descriptive speech. more detail
Then the subjects are asked in this order:
Does the average person judge that the two problems are
equivalent according to you?
Do you judge that the two problems are equivalent?
Rationale for this dual design: Bypass a possible
«persistence bias» in the response. More detail
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Behavioral data
fMRI data
Robustness of this type of framing effects
Violation of the invariance principle and irrationality
«Norm retrieval» test (3 out of 3)
We are interested in the reaction of a subject when
realizing she was previously inconsistent.
A «feeling of irrationality» - «epistemic discomfort» - might
exist.
We envision to pin down such hypothetical feeling through an
fMRI procedure.
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Behavioral data
fMRI data
Capture a possible feeling of discomfort while realizing ex post one’s inconsistency
Neural underpinnings of the moral act
Epistemic discomfort
We are currently running an experiment resting on the «bat
and ball» cognitive defect - massive rate of error while
performing the cognitive task. One of our aims is to capture
the feedback process when the subjects realize their
error.
Using these fMRI data we might recognize in the FE
experiment the same specific neural substrate(s) activated
after realizing a cognitive defect.
Sort of «epistemic discomfort» when one realizes she was
inconsistent.
Look at the contrast between the subjects who corrected
their previous inconsistent choices, and the steady profiles
(steadily inconsistent and steadily consistent).
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Project: Pin down framing effects in situation of risky choice
Behavioral data
fMRI data
Capture a possible feeling of discomfort while realizing ex post one’s inconsistency
Neural underpinnings of the moral act
Two competing hypothesis to pin down the moral
dimension
If our competing hypothesis is true - sensitivity to the
emotional-moral content of the task, which are the
mechanisms involved?
Two alternative theories:
A purely emotional one involving Dual Process Theory’s
automatic-experiential system - S1 in Kahneman terms.
A cognitive-based one involving Dual Process Theory’s
analytical regions - S2 in Kahneman terms.
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Behavioral data
fMRI data
Capture a possible feeling of discomfort while realizing ex post one’s inconsistency
Neural underpinnings of the moral act
The emotional hypothesis
Choice of the gamble in the negative frame stems from a «gut
feeling».
Sort of emergency signal: «I can’t do that!».
→ Specific activation of limbic substrates involving S1
should be observed when facing moral-content scenarios,
vis-à-vis neutral ones.
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Behavioral data
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Capture a possible feeling of discomfort while realizing ex post one’s inconsistency
Neural underpinnings of the moral act
Morality as broadened rationality
The alternative hypothesis: the trade-off between the two
options is more complicated within the negative frame as
compared with the positive frame:
Within the positive frame, risk aversion dominates the choice:
evaluation process boils down to choose a «satisfying solution»,
the «sure gain» (bounded rationality).
Conversely a broadened rationality is involved within the
negative frame because the outcome is morally unacceptable to
wit trade-off between uncertainty and outcome. Flesh out
→ Specific activation of cognitive substrates involving S2
should be observed.
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Sketch of model to explain FE by introducing
moral-emotional content (1 out of 2)
«Broadened» rationality allows a difference of valence between
the two equivalent – from a logical point of view – outcomes
in FE.
Use of a framework inspired of L L Lopes’ theory of «security
needs» and Prospect Theory’s theory of status-quo.
Define a «security seeker» as a subject who systematically
outweighs the worst outcome in a gamble (sort of max min
behavior) −→ The security seeker will choose the «sure
thing» instead of the gamble in FE (to put it another way, she
is risk averse).
Hence if we just consider the «security needs» dimension
(natural saliency of the worse outcome within a gamble), will
predict risk-aversion behavior whatever the frame.
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Sketch of model to explain FE by introducing
moral-emotional content (2 out of 2)
Now let’s consider the emotional-moral dimension.
Claim: the «sure thing» in the negative frame of asian-disease
is a morally unacceptable outcome. The representation of
myself’s causing human death has a higher valence (namely
stronger negative psychological consequences) than the same
logical output in the positive frame.
Optimal choice for a «security seeker»:
If the «sure outcome» is acceptable then the trade-off process
is simple: choice of the sure thing. → Bounded rationality.
Conversely if unacceptable the cognitive process goes beyond.
→ Broadened rationality involves a cognitive conflict.
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The retrieval test
The experimenter explains the logical equivalence through a
purely descriptive speech, namely she does not impose the
rational norm:
«One might consider that the two problems are equivalent, to
the extent that from a purely logical point of view, they are
equivalent. Indeed, [here the analytical proof]...»
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Caveat related to the «within-subjects» strategy
One session: 4 problems presented successively corresponding
to the 4 scenarios (order is random), for the two frame: 8
choices per session.
Trade-off regarding the choice of the experimental design:
«between-subjects» design Vs «within-subjects» design.
Relative gain of the «within-subjects» design: «framing
effect» for individuals, not an aggregate outcome, and
possibility to exploit individual differences.
Relative costs:
Risk of bias, if the subject notices the variation in the frame
(such variation if perceived is a cue for the subject, induced
to be consistent in our experiment).
Risk of memory of the previous scenario while performing the
next one.
To solve this introduce «filler» tasks.
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These particular design is to reveal the «true» preference
of the subjects
We are aware of a potential problem associated with the
«retrieval test»: if the subject was previously inconsistent in
the FE experiment (namely provided a response in PF that is
logically inconsistent with the one she gave in NF), might be
inclined to provide the same response pattern; otherwise
will suffer psychological dissonance → possible Persistence
bias.
We claim that the first answer (to the question: «Would the
average person judge that the two problems are equivalent?»)
mirrors the «true» reaction of the subject (to wit the response
without the dissonance effect); if gap between the first
answer and the self-perspective → piece of evidence towards
the existence of psychological dissonance.
back
S.Bourgeois-Gironde and Élise Payzan Budapest 07/05
